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St. Thomas Aquinas
excerpts
from
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
from the Christian
Classics Etherial Library website.
THE SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
QUESTION 36 OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider envy, and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1)
What is envy?
(2)
Whether it is a sin?
(3)
Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4)
Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
Article (1)
Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
Objection 1:
It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the object of
envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the envious man
that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which is racked
by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind of
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is a
cause, not of sorrow but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause
of envy: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious
of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in
habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow is caused
by a defect, wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to
sorrow, as stated above (FS, Q[47], A[3]) when we were treating of
the passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and
who are considered wise, are envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet.
ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 4: Further, sorrow is opposed
to pleasure. Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause.
Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed is a cause
of pleasure, as stated above (FS, Q[32], A[3]) it will not be a
cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who have or have had things that
befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time." Therefore
sloth is not a kind of sorrow.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 14) calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that "envy is
sorrow for another's good."
I answer that, The object of a man's
sorrow is his own evil. Now it may happen that another's good is
apprehended as one's own evil, and in this way sorrow can be about
another's good. But this happens in two ways: first, when a man is
sorry about another's good, in so far as it threatens to be an
occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for his enemy's
prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow
is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states
(Rhet. ii, 9).
Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as
being one's own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of
one's own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy
grieves for another's good: and consequently men are envious of
those goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like
to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii,
10).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders
what is good for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in
this way it is possible for sorrow to be about good, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: Since envy is
about another's good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a
man desires to have, it follows that a man is envious of those only
whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But this does not
apply to people who are far removed from one another: for no man,
unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to rival or surpass in
reputation those who are far above him. Thus a commoner does not
envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom he is far
above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from
him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near him,
and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our will
that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives
rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so
far as it is in agreement with the will.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not
strive for mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he
does not envy one who surpasses him in such matters, unless he
surpass him by little, for then it seems to him that this is not
beyond him, and so he makes an effort; wherefore, if his effort
fails through the other's reputation surpassing his, he grieves.
Hence it is that those who love to be honored are more envious; and
in like manner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are
great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon
that they themselves have been bested in something great. Hence it
is written (Job
5:2): "Envy slayeth the little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v,
46) that "we can envy those only whom we think better in some
respect than ourselves."
Reply to Objection 4: Recollection of
past goods in so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far
as we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so far as others have
them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to belittle our
reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that the old envy
the young, and those who have spent much in order to get something,
envy those who have got it by spending little, because they grieve
that they have lost their goods, and that others have acquired
goods.
Article (2) Whether envy is a sin?
Objection 1:
It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let
her have companions, so that she may learn together with
them, envy them, and be nettled when they are praised." But
no one should be advised to commit a sin. Therefore envy is
not a sin
Objection 1: Further, "Envy is
sorrow for another's good," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is
written (Prov.
29:2): "When the wicked shall bear rule, the people
shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, envy
denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good zeal, according
to
Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up."
Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, punishment
is condivided with fault. But envy is a kind of punishment:
for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul sore of envy
corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For
paleness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down,
the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there
is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth."
Therefore envy is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal.
5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory,
provoking one another, envying one another."
I answer that, As stated above
(A[1]), envy is sorrow for another's good. Now this sorrow
may come about in four ways. First, when a man grieves for
another's good, through fear that it may cause harm either
to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy,
as stated above (A[1]), and may be void of sin. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that
without charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy
rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy,
saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are
deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest many
suffer unjustly."
Secondly, we may grieve over another's
good, not because he has it, but because the good which he
has, we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be
about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to
1 Cor. 14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if
it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or
sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over another's good,
because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of it.
Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods,
which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states,
is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the
worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow {nemesis}
[*The nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the
word "nemesis" to signify "revenge" does not represent the
original Greek.], saying that it belongs to good morals. But
he says this because he considered temporal goods in
themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who
look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the
teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who
are unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just
ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for
their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in
comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for
good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy
Writ, according to
Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them
that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps.
72:2,3): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was
envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners
[*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked,
seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we grieve
over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours;
this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as
also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so
is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our
neighbor's good.
Reply to Objection 1: Envy there
denotes the zeal with which we ought to strive to progress
with those who are better than we are.
Reply to Objection 2: This
argument considers sorrow for another's good in the first
sense given above.
Reply to Objection 3: Envy
differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a certain zeal may
be good, whereas envy is always evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Nothing
hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as stated above
(FS, Q[87], A[2]) when we were treating of sins.
Article (3) Whether envy is a mortal sin?
Objection 1:
It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since envy
is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive
appetite. Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but
only in the reason, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12)
[*Cf. FS, Q[74], A[4]]. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, there
cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can be in them,
for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and
known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned
pale and looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore
envy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every
mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is contrary,
not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a passion,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy
is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job
5:2): "Envy slayeth the little one." Now nothing slays
spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal
sin.
I answer that, Envy is a mortal
sin, in respect of its genus. For the genus of a sin is
taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect of
its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives
its spiritual life, according to
1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to
life, because we love the brethren." Now the object both of
charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by contrary
movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above
(A[1]). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal
sin in respect of its genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35],
A[4]; FS, Q[72], A[5], ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we
find certain imperfect movements in the sensuality, which
are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first
movement of anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the
genus of envy we find sometimes even in perfect men certain
first movements, which are venial sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The
movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of the
sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human
acts, the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of
that kind is not a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy
of little children who have not the use of reason: wherefore
the Reply to the Second Objection is manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: According
to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to
{nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons. For it is
directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over
his neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over
his neighbor's evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he
states in the same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious.
On the other hand, envy is contrary to {nemesis} on the part
of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for {nemesis}
is sorrow for the good of the undeserving according to
Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on
occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners'],
whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are
deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the former
contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity is a
virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
Article (4) Whether envy is a capital vice?
Objection 1:
It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is
the daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 10) that "those who love honor and glory are more
envious." Therefore envy is not a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the
capital vices seem to be less grave than the other vices
which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45):
"The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived
mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them
provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the
mind with their wild outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most
grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "Though in every
evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is
infused into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the
serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane of
spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is
not a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, it seems
that its daughters are unfittingly assigned by Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred,
tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes,
and grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's
misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same
as envy, as appears from what has been said above (A[3]).
Therefore these should not be assigned as daughters of envy.
On the contrary stands the authority of
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital
sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters thereto.
I answer that, Just as sloth is
grief for a Divine spiritual good, so envy is grief for our
neighbor's good. Now it has been stated above (Q[35], A[4])
that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it incites
man to do certain things, with the purpose either of
avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy
is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory
says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices are so closely
akin to one another that one springs from the other. For the
first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting
the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for
the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another
should acquire that power." Consequently the notion of a
capital vice does not exclude its originating from another
vice, but it demands that it should have some principal
reason for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin.
However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from
vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by
Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v,
1).
Reply to Objection 2: It does
not follow from the passage quoted that envy is the greatest
of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he is
enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart,
for as quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy
of the devil, death came into the world" (Wis.
2:24).
There is, however, a kind of envy which
is accounted among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of
another's spiritual good, which envy is a sorrow for the
increase of God's grace, and not merely for our neighbor's
good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost,
because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost
Himself, Who is glorified in His works.
Reply to Objection 3: The
number of envy's daughters may be understood for the reason
that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by
way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something
by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower
another's reputation, and this either secretly, and then we
have "tale-bearing," or openly, and then we have
"detraction." The middle consists in the fact that when a
man aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so,
and then we have "joy at another's misfortune," or he is
unable, and then we have "grief at another's prosperity."
The term is hatred itself, because just as good which
delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated
above (Q[34], A[6]). Grief at another's prosperity is in one
way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over
another's prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a
good name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in
so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper
notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other
hand, "joy at another's misfortune" is not directly the same
as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over our
neighbor's good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his
evil.
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