We must now consider
the contemplative life, under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to
the intellect only, or also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in
one action or in several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains
to the contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in
this state can arise to the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius
(Div. Nom. iv);
(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
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Article 1.
Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1:
It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do
with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect.
For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia,
1]) that "the end of contemplation is truth." Now truth
pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem
that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory
says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that "Rachel, which
is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or rather, 'One
seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf.
Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life."
Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the
intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly
to the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the
contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has
nothing to do with the appetitive power.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling with
our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to
desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love
pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated
above (FS,
Q[25], A[2];
FS, Q[26], A[2]). Therefore the contemplative life has
also something to do with the affective or appetitive power.
I answer that, As stated above
(Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the contemplative who
are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now
intention is an act of the will, as stated above (FS,
Q[12], A[1]), because intention is of the end which is
the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life,
as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the
intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise
of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the
other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as
stated above (FP,
Q[82], A[4];
FS, Q[9], A[1]).
Now the appetitive power moves one to
observe things either with the senses or with the intellect,
sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is
written (Mat.
6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also,"
sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires
by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative
life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through
loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since
everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows
that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is
seated in the affective power, the result being that love
also becomes more intense.
Reply to Objection 1: From the
very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the
aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful,
and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 2: We are
urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by
the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs
to see the face of its Creator."
Reply to Objection 3: The
appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to
perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice
the act of contemplation, as stated above.
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Article 2. Whether the moral virtues pertain to
the contemplative life?
Objection 1:
It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
that "the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God
and our neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral
virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of
the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our
neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law" (Rom.
13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues
belong to the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the
contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation
of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the mind
tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness
of heart, which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf.
Q[8], A[7]]. For it is written (Mat.
5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall
see God": and (Heb.
12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem
that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life gives
beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of
whom it is said (Gn.
29:17) that she was "of a beautiful countenance." Now
the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,
especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain
to the contemplative life.
On the contrary, The moral
virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says
(Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]]) that it
belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external
action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.
I answer that, A thing may
belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or
dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the
contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which
pertains to the consideration of truth, "has little
influence on the moral virtues": wherefore he declares
(Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but
not to contemplative happiness.
On the other hand, the moral virtues
belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act
of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially
consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the
passions which withdraw the soul's intention from
intelligible to sensible things, and by outward
disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of
the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward
occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated
above (A[1]), the contemplative life has its motive cause on
the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of
God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life.
Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing,
but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow
that the moral virtues belong essentially to the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: Holiness
or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are
concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the
reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about
operations, according to
Is. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since
he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions
of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues
dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and
cleanness of heart.
Reply to Objection 3: Beauty,
as stated above (Q[145],
A[2]), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion.
Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because
both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing
of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since
the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason,
there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence;
wherefore it is written (Wis.
8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a lover
of her beauty."
On the other hand, beauty is in the
moral virtues by participation, in so far as they
participate in the order of reason; and especially is it in
temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which
especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the
virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for
contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh
the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq.
i, 10).
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Article 3. Whether there are various
actions pertaining to the contemplative life?
Objection 1:
It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat.
Contempl. i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation,"
"meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently
pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there
are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the
Apostle says (2
Cor. 3:18): "But we . . . beholding [speculantes] the
glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the
same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from glory to
glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio]
belongs to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard
says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and greatest
contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of
fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are
requisite for the contemplative life.
Objection 4: Further, "Prayer,"
"reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in
N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the contemplative life.
Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life: since it
is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His
word" (Lk.
10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are
requisite for the contemplative life.
On the contrary, Life signifies
here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent.
Wherefore if there are several operations of the
contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several
contemplative lives.
I answer that, We are now
speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel
there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth
by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the
perception of a simple truth by a process from several
premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one
act wherein it is finally completed, namely the
contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final
act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles,
from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others
are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth,
the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning
act is the contemplation itself of the truth.
Reply to Objection 1: According
to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard
the consideration of the many things from which a person
intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking
cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations.
and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of
anything that conduces to the truth in view: although,
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may
signify any actual operation of the intellect. "Meditation"
would seem to be the process of reason from certain
principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard
(De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher
(De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be
called "consideration." But "contemplation" regards the
simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says
again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that "contemplation is the
soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze;
meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance
which is prone to wander."
Reply to Objection 2: According
to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine on this
passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in a
mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]." Now to
see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect
wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would
seem to be reducible to meditation.
Reply to Objection 3:
Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension
of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results
from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was
stated above (A[1]) that contemplation terminates in the
affections.
Reply to Objection 4: Man
reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means
of things received from another. In this way, as regards the
things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according to
Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom
came upon me": while as regards the things he receives from
man, he needs "hearing," in so far as he receives from the
spoken word, and "reading," in so far as he receives from
the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply
himself by his personal study, and thus he requires
"meditation."
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Article 5 Whether in the present state
of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of
the Divine essence?
Objection 1:
It would seem that in the present state of life the
contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine
essence. For, as stated in
Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face,
and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is
the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem
that in the present life one may come, by means of
contemplation, to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory
says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men withdraw within
themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they
ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being
desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress
all the images of their limited comprehension, and through
longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that
which they are." Now man is not hindered from seeing the
Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by
the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can
extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light in its
essence.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory
says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are small to the soul
that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of God," the
blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower
and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only
see such things by the light of God." Now the blessed
Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation
of the present life can extend to the vision of the essence
of God.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no
one reaches such a height of contemplation as to fix the
eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible
light."
I answer that, As Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing God lives this
mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play: and
unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going
altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his
carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This
has been carefully discussed above (Q[175], AA[4],5), where
we spoke of rapture, and in the
FP, Q[12], A[2], where we treated of the vision of God.
Accordingly we must state that one may
be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that
is to say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and
thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to
the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this
life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say,
when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet
so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of
the imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the
contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision
of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree of
contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in
rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the
present life and the life to come.
Reply to Objection 1: As
Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone seeing
God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but
something belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.): "By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the
soul sees something of lower degree, and is thereby
refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of
vision." Accordingly the words of Jacob, "I saw God face to
face" do not imply that he saw God's essence, but that he
saw some shape [*Cf.
FP, Q[12], A[11], ad 1], imaginary of course, wherein
God spoke to him. Or, "since we know a man by his face, by
the face of God he signified his knowledge of Him,"
according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.
Reply to Objection 2: In the
present state of life human contemplation is impossible
without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the
Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual
knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves, but
in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible
truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but also in
that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic
hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power
we are brought back to the single ray of light," i.e. to the
simple knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this
sense that we must understand the statement of Gregory that
"contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows of
things corporeal," since their contemplation is not fixed on
them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.
Reply to Objection 3: By these
words Gregory does not imply that the blessed Benedict, in
that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to show
that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God,"
it follows that all things can easily be seen through the
enlightenment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For
however little he may see of the Creator's light, all
created things become petty to him."
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Article 7.
Whether there is
delight in contemplation?
Objection 1: It
would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For
delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas
contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it
would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, all
strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is
strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says (Hom.
xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate
God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost
overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes
something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time
it almost succumbs, because even while tasting, it fails."
Therefore there is no delight in contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, delight
is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in Ethic. x,
4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
according to
1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the
contemplative life.
Objection 4: Further, a lesion
of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation
causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated (Gn.
32) that after Jacob had said (Gn.
32:30), "'I have seen God face to face' . . . he halted
on his foot (Gn.
32:31) . . . because he touched the sinew of his thigh
and it shrank" (Gn.
32:32). Therefore seemingly there is no delight in
contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written
of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is
sweetness exceedingly lovable."
I answer that, There may be
delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First
by reason of the operation itself [*Cf.
FS, Q[3], A[5]], because each individual delights in the
operation which befits him according to his own nature or
habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according
to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that
"all men naturally desire to know," so that consequently
they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful
still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates
without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be
delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one
contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision
gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in
itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since,
then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the
contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as
stated above (AA[1],2,
ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative
life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but
also by reason of the Divine love.
In both respects the delight thereof
surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight
is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above (FS,
Q[31], A[5]), when we were treating of the passions, and
because the love whereby God is loved out of charity
surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps.
33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet."
Reply to Objection 1: Although
the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the
intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is
through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of
God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it
follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative
life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in
seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object
seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom.
xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love, we are so
aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate
perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine
truth be not only seen but also loved.
Reply to Objection 2: Strife
or struggle arising from the opposition of an external
thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not
in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which
he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being
equal, he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says
(Confess. viii, 3) that "the more peril there was in the
battle, the greater the joy in the triumph." But there is no
strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the truth
which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our
defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags
us down to lower things, according to
Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible body as a load upon the
soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things." Hence it is that when man attains
to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while
he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his
corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom.
7:24): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from
the body of this death?" Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.): "When God is once known by desire and
understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us."
Reply to Objection 3: The
contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison
with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the
delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as
compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of
which it is written (Ps.
35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy
pleasure." Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things
which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more
delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on
account of the excellence of that which is contemplated.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): "We may
happen to have our own little theories about those sublime
beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but
feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they
give us more delight than any of those things that are round
about us": and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.): "The contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly
lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens
heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the
mind."
Reply to Objection 4: After
contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, "because we need
to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong in
the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.).
"Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one
foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts
on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound."
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Article 8.
Whether
the contemplative life is continuous?
Objection 1: It
would seem that the contemplative life is not continuous.
For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual
perfections of this life will be made void, according to
1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether prophecies shall be made void, or
tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed."
Therefore the contemplative life is made void.
Objection 2: Further, a man
tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a
short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x, 40),
"Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost
soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous
weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the
words of
Job 4:15, "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral.
v, 33): "The mind does not remain long at rest in the
sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to
itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light."
Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.
Objection 3: Further, that
which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now the
contemplative life, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x,
7), "is better than the life which is according to man."
Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not
continuous.
On the contrary, our Lord said
(Lk.
10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not
be taken away from her," since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.), "the contemplative life begins here so that it may
be perfected in our heavenly home."
I answer that, A thing may be
described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its
nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in
regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two
reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and
unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary,
for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13. But even in our
regard contemplative life is continuous---both because it is
competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the
soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after
this life---and because in the works of the contemplative
life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more
able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. x, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The
manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven:
yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end.
Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The
contemplative life begins here, so as to be perfected in our
heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn
here is aflame with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom
we love."
Reply to Objection 2: No action
can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of
contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier.
iii], and as we have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence
although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it
can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative
acts.
Reply to Objection 3: The
Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man,
because it befits us "so far as there is in us something
divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is
incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act
can endure longer.
