After treating individually of all the virtues and vices
that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must
now consider those things which pertain especially to
certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as
regards things connected with the soul's habits and acts.
First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces,
according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of
graces . . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the
word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge," etc.
Another difference arises from the diversities of life,
namely the active and the contemplative life, which
correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is
stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that "there are diversities of
operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who
"was busy about much serving," which pertains to the active
life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who
sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk.
10:39,40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third
difference corresponds to the various duties and states of
life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, "And He gave some apostles;
and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other
some pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of
ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): "There are
diversities of ministries."
With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object
to be considered, it must be observed that some of them
pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation.
Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised
under "prophecy," since prophetic revelation extends not
only to future events relating to man, but also to things
relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed
by all and are matters of "faith," and as to yet higher
mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to "wisdom."
Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to
spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil;
this pertains to the "discernment of spirits." Moreover it
extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to
"knowledge," as we shall explain further on ([3682]Q[177]).
Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and
rapture which is a degree of prophecy.
Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its
essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge;
(4) the division of prophecy.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
(2) Whether it is a habit?
(3) Whether it is only about future
contingencies?
(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible
matters of prophecy?
(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which
he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he
perceives by his own spirit?
(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of
prophecy?
__________________________________________________________________
Article 1. Whether prophecy pertains to
knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to
knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after
death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus.
49:18) it is said of Joseph that "his bones were visited,
and after death they prophesied." Now no knowledge remains
in the body or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy
does not pertain to knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that
prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech
is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it would
seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes
folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent with
prophecy; for it is written (Osee 9:7): "Know ye, O Israel,
that the prophet was foolish and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual
man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is not a cognitive
perfection.
Objection 4: Further, just as revelation regards the
intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the
affections, since it denotes a kind of motion. Now prophecy
is described as "inspiration" or "revelation," according to
Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i]. Therefore it would
seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more
than to the affections.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Kings 9:9): "For he
that is now called a prophet, in time past was called a
seer." Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore prophecy
pertains to knowledge.
I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in
knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are
far [procul] removed from man's knowledge. Wherefore they
may be said to take their name from {phanos}, "apparition,"
because things appear to them from afar. Wherefore, as
Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament, they
were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and
surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen
nations they were known as "vates, on account of their power
of mind [vi mentis]," [*The Latin 'vates' is from the Greek
{phates}, and may be rendered 'soothsayer'] (Etym. viii, 7).
Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto
profit," and further on (1 Cor. 14:12): "Seek to abound unto
the edification of the Church," it follows that prophecy
consists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets
declare for the instruction of others, the things they know
through being taught of God, according to the saying of Is.
21:10, "That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the
God of Israel, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, as
Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may be described as
"proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar [porro
fantur]," that is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the
truth about things to come."
Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God
cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as
regards the operation of the Divine power, according to Mk.
16:20, "They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working
withal and confirming the word with signs that followed."
Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with the working of
miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic
utterances. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): "There
arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the
Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders."
Reply to Objection 1: These passages speak of prophecy in
reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards
the proof of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the
prophetic utterances.
Reply to Objection 3: Those prophets who are described as
foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it
is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken not to the words of the
prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a
vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the
Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that
follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
Reply to Objection 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the
intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Divine
things: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man,
stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee." This raising
of the intention is brought about by the motion of the Holy
Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the Spirit
entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the
mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it
perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: "And
I heard Him speaking to me." Accordingly inspiration is
requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind,
according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of the Almighty
giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as
regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby
prophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness and
ignorance is removed, according to Job 12:22, "He
discovereth great things out of darkness."
__________________________________________________________________
Article 2. Whether prophecy is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For
according to Ethic. ii, 5, "there are three things in the
soul, power, passion, and habit." Now prophecy is not a
power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers of
the soul are common to them. Again it is not a passion,
since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as
stated above ([3683]FS, Q[22] , A[2]); whereas prophecy
pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the
foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.
Objection 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is
not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection
of the soul; and it is not always in act, else a prophet
could not be described as asleep. Therefore seemingly
prophecy is a habit.
Objection 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the
gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after
the manner of a habit, as stated above ([3684]FS, Q[110],
A[2]). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
On the contrary, A habit is something "whereby we act
when we will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd,
1120-1198] says (De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of
prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (4
Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning
the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a
minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy
might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and
fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom.
i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is
made manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the
manifestation of the material sight takes place through
material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual
sight takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly
manifestation must be proportionate to the light by means of
which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to
its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that
surpasses natural reason, as stated above [3685](A[1]), it
follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light
surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying of
Micah 7:8: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light."
Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of
an abiding form, as material light is in the sun, and in
fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing impression,
as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in
the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a
prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly
false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes
the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it
always within the call of his mind, yet so that in its
absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift." Hence
Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings 4:27): "Her soul
is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath
not told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual
light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete
form, perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of
knowing the principle of the things manifested by that
light; thus by the light of the active intellect the
intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all things
known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to
supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is
God Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence,
although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this
light is by way of an abiding and complete form, according
to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light."
It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the
prophet's soul by way of a passion or transitory impression.
This is indicated Ex. 33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I
will set thee in a hole of the rock," etc., and 3 Kings
19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord;
and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that even as
the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the
prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus
a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art
needs to have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is
written (Is. 1:4): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so
that I may hear Him as a master." This is also indicated by
the very manner in which prophecies are uttered: thus it is
stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or
that "the word of the Lord," or "the hand of the Lord was
made upon him."
But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident
that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.
Reply to Objection 1: This division of the Philosopher's
does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but
only such as can be principles of moral actions, which are
done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes
from mere power, as in the case of those who perform an
action from the judgment of their reason before having the
habit of that action.
However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we
understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which
sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to
understand is, in a way, to be passive." For just as, in
natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to the
light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge
the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the
Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a
passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a
repetition of the passion---thus wood once ignited is more
easily ignited again, so too in the prophet's intellect,
after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains an
aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind has
once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to
its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum.
Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest
devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled."
We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet,
even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual,
on account of his being deputed by God, according to Jer.
1:5, "And I made thee a prophet unto the nations."
Reply to Objection 3: Every gift of grace raises man to
something above human nature, and this may happen in two
ways. First, as to the substance of the act---for instance,
the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the uncertain
and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and for such acts man
is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing
is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance
of the act---for instance to love God and to know Him in the
mirror of His creatures---and for this a habitual gift of
grace is bestowed.
__________________________________________________________________
Article 3. Whether prophecy is only about
future contingencies?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about
future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super
Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration or
revelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeable
truth." Now issues pertain to future contingencies.
Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of
prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are
about Divine things; and from the discernment of spirits,
which is about created spirits; and from knowledge, which is
about human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated
by their objects, as stated above ([3686]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not
connected with any of the above. Therefore it follows that
it is about future contingencies alone.
Objection 3: Further, difference of object causes difference
of species, as stated above ([3687]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies,
and another about other things, it would seem to follow that
these are different species of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.)
that some prophecies are "about the future, for instance
(Is. 7:14), 'Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a
son'"; some are "about the past, as (Gn. 1:1), 'In the
beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are "about
the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), "If all prophesy, and
there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of
his heart are made manifest." Therefore prophecy is not
about future contingencies alone.
I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain
light can extend to all those things that are subject to
that light: thus the body's sight extends to all colors, and
the soul's natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject
to the light of the active intellect. Now prophetic
knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
possible to know all things both Divine and human, both
spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic
revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of
spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of
God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is written,
"I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated."
Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural
bodies, according to the words of Is. 40:12, "Who hath
measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also
contains matters relating to human conduct, according to Is.
58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this
it contains things pertaining to future events, according to
Is. 47:9, "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one
day, barrenness and widowhood."
Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our
knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things
are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are to
prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree
comprises things remote from the knowledge, either sensitive
or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the
knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense
things present to him locally, which another man does not
know by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus
Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done
in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret
thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another,
according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one
man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another
prophetically.
The second degree comprises those things which surpass the
knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in
themselves unknowable, but on account of a defect in human
knowledge; such as the mystery of the Trinity, which was
revealed by the Seraphim saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc.
(Is. 6:3).
The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge
of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are
future contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate.
And since that which is predicated universally and by its
very nature, takes precedence of that which is predicated in
a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of
future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from
this prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says
(Hom. i super Ezech.): "And since a prophet is so called
because he foretells the future, his name loses its
significance when he speaks of the past or present."
Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is there defined according to
its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is
differentiated from the other gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: This is evident from what has just
been said. We might also reply that all those things that
are the matter of prophecy have the common aspect of being
unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; whereas those
that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge," and the
"interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through
natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through
the enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith,"
although it is about things invisible to man, it is not
concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but
with a man's certitude of assent to things known by others.
Reply to Objection 3: The formal element in prophetic
knowledge is the Divine light, which being one, gives unity
of species to prophecy, although the things prophetically
manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
__________________________________________________________________
Article 4. Whether by the Divine revelation
a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically?
Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a
prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is
written (Amos 3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without
revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Now
whatever is revealed prophetically is something done by God.
Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to
the prophet.
Objection 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4).
Now prophecy is a "Divine revelation," as stated above
[3688](A[3]). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be
so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed
prophetically, since "the perfect is that which lacks
nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of
prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy
is more powerful than the right of natural reason which is
the cause of human science. Now a man who has acquired a
science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a
grammarian knows all matters of grammar. Therefore it would
seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.)
that "sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present
to the prophet's mind and nowise the future; and sometimes
it points not to the present but to the future." Therefore
the prophet does not know all matters of prophecy.
I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not
exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in
which they are connected and on which they depend: thus it
has been stated above ([3689]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2) that all
the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on account of
prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known
through some principle are connected in that principle and
depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as
regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same
time all that can be known through that principle; whereas
if the common principle is unknown, or known only in a
general way, it does not follow that one knows all those
things at the same time, but each of them has to be
manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may
be known, and some not.
Now the principle of those things that are prophetically
manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the
prophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need
for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; but each
one knows some of them according to the special revelation
of this or that matter.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all
things that are necessary for the instruction of the
faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one, and
some to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Prophecy is by way of being something
imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is
written (1 Cor. 13:8) that "prophecies shall be made void,"
and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. imperfectly. The Divine
revelation will be brought to its perfection in heaven;
wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall
be done away." Consequently it does not follow that nothing
is lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none
of those things to which prophecy is directed.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a science knows the
principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to
that science depends; wherefore to have the habit of a
science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that
science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic knowledge
is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the
comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Article 5. Whether the prophet always
distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he
says by the prophetic spirit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always
distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he
says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (Confess.
vi, 13) that his mother said "she could, through a certain
feeling, which in words she could not express, discern
betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul."
Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above
[3690](A[3]). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes
what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by
his own spirit.
Objection 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as
Jerome [*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works
of St. Jerome] says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer.
23:28): "The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a
dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with
truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what he has
through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
Objection 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine
light is greater than that which results from the light of
natural reason. Now he that has science, by the light of
natural reason knows for certain that he has it. Therefore
he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much more certain
that he has it.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.):
"It must be observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when
consulted, utter certain things by their own spirit, through
being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are
speaking by the prophetic spirit."
I answer that, The prophet's mind is instructed by God in
two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another
way by a most mysterious instinct to "which the human mind
is subjected without knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the greatest
certitude about those things which he knows by an express
revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed
to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In
truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in
your hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, the
faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would
not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be
gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a
prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten
son, which he nowise would have done had he not been most
certain of the Divine revelation.
On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he
knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to
distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived of
Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which
we know by Divine instinct are not all manifested with
prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something
imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are
to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this
should lead to error, "they are very soon set aright by the
Holy Ghost [*For instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from
Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves
for having said what was untrue," as Gregory adds (Hom. i
super Ezech.).
The arguments set down in the first place consider the
revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore
the answer to all the objections is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
Article 6. Whether things known or declared
prophetically can be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared
prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future
contingencies, as stated above (A[3] ). Now future
contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would
happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be
false.
Objection 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying
(Is. 38:1): "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt
surely die, and shalt not live," and yet fifteen years were
added to his life (4 Kings 20:6). Again the Lord said (Jer.
18:7,8): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against
a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it.
If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of
their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have
thought to do them." This is instanced in the example of the
Ninevites, according to Jn. 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God']
had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He
would do to them, and He did it not." Therefore the matter
of prophecy can be false.
Objection 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever
the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is
absolutely necessary, because the consequent of a
conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the
antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a
syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in
I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be
false, the following conditional proposition must needs be
true: "If a thing has been prophesied, it will be." Now the
antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely
necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the
consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about
contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of
prophecy cannot be false.
On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i]
that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation,
announcing the issue of things with invariable truth." Now
the truth of prophecy would not be invariable, if its matter
could be false. Therefore nothing false can come under
prophecy.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said
([3691]AA[1],3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed
under the form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by
Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge is the same in
disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple is
a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher, even as in
natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness
of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense
when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is
the seal of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same
truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances,
as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can
possibly come, as stated in the [3692]FP, Q[16], A[8].
Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [3693]FP, Q[14],
A[13] the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not
exclude the contingency of future singular events, because
that knowledge regards the future as present and already
determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is
an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the Divine
foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude
the contingency of future things.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards
future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves,
in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presentiality:
secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order
of causes in relation to their effects. And though future
contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate
to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are
not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,
though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine
intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic
revelation, because an imprint made by an active cause is
not always on a par with the virtue of that cause. Hence
sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness
of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards
future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen
in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of Is.
7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes, however,
the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the
Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to
effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than
foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for
the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether
they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to
lead to such a result. In this way we are to understand the
saying of Is. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not live"; in other
words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to
death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and
Nineveh shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits
demand that it should be destroyed." God is said "to
repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after
the manner of one who repents, by "changing His sentence,
although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. [3694]FP, Q[19],
A[7], ad 2].
Reply to Objection 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is
the same as the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated
above, the conditional proposition: "If this was prophesied,
it will be," is true in the same way as the proposition: "If
this was foreknown, it will be": for in both cases it is
impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the
consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future
in our regard, but as being present to the Divine
foreknowledge, as stated in the [3695]FP, Q[14], A[13], ad
2.
__________________________________________________________________
